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I. INTRODUCTION
So much has been written and said already regarding the
protection of trademarks when they are registered as domain
names that yet another piece may seem a bit superfluous. However,
1
although the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) has been
2
critiqued in many different manners and in many different fora,
the greater normative implications of the UDRP and resulting
dispute resolution methodology have not been explored to the
same extent. This essay explores those normative implications
using data reported in other studies as well as data collected
specifically for this paper. This essay concludes that the UDRP is a
manifestation of the privatization and commercialization of the
process of solving disputes regarding who should be the proper
1. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”),
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Oct. 24, 1999, available at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (updated Feb. 5, 2002)
[hereinafter UDRP]. ICANN was created in October 1998 as a non-profit
corporation comprising a coalition of the internet’s business, technical, academic
and user communities to takeover technical coordination of the assignment of
internet domain names, IP (“Internet Protocol”) address numbers and protocol
parameter and port numbers previously performed by the U.S. Dept. of
Commerce. ICANN Homepage, at http://www.icann.org (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
2. See Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, LAWBYTES.COM, Aug. 2000, available at
http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/geistudrp.pdf. Some critics suggest that the UDRP
does not go far enough to protect trademark holders by not including a discovery
process, and by not compensating for the increased sophistication of
cybersquatters and the inability to obtain damages. Marcelo Halpern & Ajay K.
Mehrotra, From International Treaties to Internet Norms: The Evolution of Internaitonal
Tradmark Disputes in the Internet Age, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 523, 557 (2000)
(stating that cybersquatters have moved beyond registered trademarks to stake out
other forms of Intellectual Property); Mitchell J. Matorin & Michael Boudett,
Domain Disputes: Cases Illustrate Limitations of ICANN Policy, 45 BOSTON BAR J. 4, 4
(2001) (“[t]he combination of a lack of discovery and the imposition of the
burden of proof on all elements can be quite problematic for complainants.”);
Matthew Edward Searing, What’s in a Domain Name? A Critical Analysis of the
National and International Impact of Domain Name Cybersquatting, 40 WASHBURN L.J.
110, 135 (2000) (“UDRP provides ‘no remedy other than the transfer of the
domain name to the trademark holder.’”). Others are concerned that the UDRP
system promotes forum shopping and is biased in favor of trademark holders who
are the complainants in arbitration. Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An Analysis of
ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, Nov. 2000, at http://dcc.syr.edu/
roughjustice.htm.
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registrant of a domain name. This privatization has created a
system of compulsory unitization–there are no alternatives. The
arbitrated results, under the UDRP, suggest bias on part of the
Panelists or the Providers (or both). Trademark owners wrote the
UDRP to serve trademark owners. It should be no surprise,
therefore, that over 83% of panels favored the complainants in
3
cases brought pursuant to the UDRP. As such, it appears that an
unnatural monopoly has been created for trademark owners. Thus,
the most important normative implication of the UDRP is that it
has chilled trademark owners’ motivation to innovate and establish
methods of identifying their web pages, other than choosing an
obvious domain name. Why invest in something new when the
current domain name system is paying off so handsomely for
trademark owners?

II. BACKGROUND
Under United States federal law, there are currently at least
four ways a trademark owner can protect its trademark when
registered and used as a domain name: (1) Trademark
4
dilution
infringement under the Lanham Act; (2) trademark
5
under section 43(c) of the Lanham Act; (3) violation of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) under section
6
43(d) of the Lanham Act; and (4) recovery of the domain name
7
under the UDRP.
The last item, the UDRP, is the focus of this essay. The other
three causes of action require federal litigation in an Article III
style court, while the UDRP is the only private, for profit dispute
resolution mechanism in place regarding domain names.

III. PREVENTION OF “CYBERSQUATTING”
The express objective of the UDRP was to provide a simple,
cheap, and quick remedy for trademark owners who were victims of

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Geist, supra note 2, at 8.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1113-1117 (2001).
Id. at § 1125(c).
Id. at § 1125(d).
UDRP, supra note 1.
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8

“cybersquatting.” Defining “cybersquatting” in a law review essay
today is like defining milk: everyone knows what it is: some like it
and some don’t. That being said, cybersquatting is the registration
of a trademark as a domain name when the registrant has no bona
fide commercial interest in the mark as a domain name and it does
not identify the registrant as the source of some good or service.
The domain name registrant registers the domain name for fun,
for profit, or for some other reason related to the blue nowhere.
The point is that on the first-come, first served registration system
followed by the domain name registrars, a legitimate trademark
owner would be prevented from registering its trademark if a
9
cybersquatter registered it first.
Prior to the creation of the UDRP, the trademark owner’s only
real remedy was in an Article III style court. This was perceived as
slow, expensive and not responsive to the trademark owner’s need
to have its trademark freed up quickly so that it might use it to
attract customers itself (or, in some cases, stop inappropriate uses
10
of its trademark as a domain name).
The first documented case of cybersquatting was that of Joshua
11
Although retold
Quittner’s “mcdonalds.com” registration.
numerous times, this story deserves a brief retelling here because it
was probably the catalyst that caused both a dash to domain names
by cybersquatters and a dash to the legislature by trademark owners
seeking relief.
In 1994, Joshua Quittner registered “mcdonalds.com” in order
to show how insecure the domain name registration system was and
how easy it would be to register a famous corporate logo as one’s
12
own domain name. McDonald’s response infuriated Quittner, a
journalist for Wired Magazine. He had originally highlighted to
McDonald’s that its primary asset (its name) was free for anyone to
13
register as a domain name. McDonald’s not only didn’t register
the mark as a domain name, it reportedly claimed that its studies
8. Halpern & Mehrotra, supra note 2, at 555.
9. See David Yan, Virtual Reality: Can We Ride Trademark Law to Surf
Cyberspace?, 10 FORDHAM I.P., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 773, 803 (2000) (stating the three
sources contributing to the definition of cybersquatting are 15 U.S.C § 1125(d),
the UDRP and caselaw).
10. Id.
11. See Tim Cole, ICANN Domain Name Dispute Policy - Year One, METRO. CORP.
COUNSEL, Feb. 2001, at 31.
12. Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered, WIRED, Oct. 1994, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.10/mcdonalds.html.
13. Id.
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showed that the users of the Internet would not use cumbersome,
long domain names. Therefore, McDonald’s had registered
“mcd.com” and was confident that it need not register
14
“mcdonalds.com” as well.
This corporate ignorance baffled Quittner and his readers, so
he registered the domain name as his own and asked for a
settlement. It is reported that McDonald’s ultimately settled the
case for $3,500 worth of computer equipment donated to a New
15
York City school.
There are multiple stories such as this from 1994. Corporate
America was certainly slow in realizing the potential of the Internet
as a commercial tool. Remember, it was December 13, 1991 when
the first web page was posted on the Internet. Corporate America—
that is, trademark owners—were slow to recognize the commercial
significance of the Internet, but the UDRP demonstrates their
current mastery of the blue nowhere.

IV. “SQUATTING”
The term “cybersquatting” is probably an unfortunate term.
There is no doubt that there is something wrong with registering
someone’s trademark as a domain name and holding it hostage
16
until the trademark owner pays the registrant $10,000 to $30,000.
Only extreme hackers and those personally offended by the
commercialization of the Internet would dispute that.
However, a better term could be used to describe those that
register someone’s trademark as a domain name with the intent to
profit from the sale of the domain name to the trademark owner.
How about thief?
“Squatting” in American jurisprudence does not necessarily
connote something negative. The notion of “squatter’s rights”
implies something keeping with all of American property
jurisprudence. That is, the action of “squatting” is to put
17
abandoned or nearly-abandoned property to a higher use. From
14. G. Andrew Barger, Cybermarks: A Proposed Hierarchial Modeling System of
Registration and Internet Architecture of Domain Names, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 623,
632 (1996).
15. Id. at 632-33.
16. Mueller, supra note 2 (stating that reports found the resale of catchy
domain names for six figure sums).
17. See Brian Gardiner, Squatter’s Rights and Adverse Possession: A Search for
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the concept of squatting evolved the notion of adverse possession.
If an owner of some property is not putting the property to its
highest use and some third party does so in an open, notorious,
hostile, and continuous manner for a prescriptive term, that third
18
party ought to be rewarded with title to that property.
In some ways, the original so-called cybersquatters were simply
putting trademarks to a higher use than the trademark owner was.
As such, keeping with the utilitarian concepts that justify much of
the Anglo-American property system, it seems that “squatting” on
someone else’s trademark as a domain name is not deserving of
such pejorative characterizations as “pirate” or “cybersquatter”.
Of course, the act of attempting to profit by the sale of the
domain name to the trademark owner defeats any sympathy one
might have for squatters. Using land as a squatter to a higher
utilitarian end is consistent with our system of jurisprudence. Using
land as a squatter and then selling it at an artificially inflated price
back to the original owner is not.
Therefore, there is no doubt that the conduct of stealing
someone’s trademark and registering it as a domain name ought to
be actionable. However, by calling such conduct “cybersquatting”
negates the positive role squatting had, and to a lesser extent still
has, on the development of land and property rights in the United
States.

V. THE UDRP
A. Justification
There were four reasons why the UDRP was deemed necessary:
(1) creating an easy way to enforce trademark rights; (2) creating
alternatives to filing suit in federal court; (3) to immunize
registrars; and (3) to create international precedent.
1. Ease of Enforcing Trademark Rights
The first proffered justification for the UDRP was that
Equitable Application of Property Laws, 8 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 119, 120-21
(1997) (citing the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of a squatter, but then
justifying positive attributes of squatting).
18. Id. at 122.
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trademark owners needed a quick vehicle by which they could
cheaply and easily wrest their trademarks away from
19
cybersquatters. It was perceived that trademark owners needed a
simple administrative procedure to follow to cancel domain names
that were registered in an attempt to block them from registering
their trademarks themselves or by which trademark owners could
obtain the rights to such domain names upon proof to the
registrars or some other body that they had superior rights in and
20
to the mark.
2. Alternatives to Filing Suit in Federal Court
Although other avenues of redress existed, they all involved
filing suit in federal court. As stated above, trademark owners had
sued cybersquatters for trademark infringement or trademark
dilution and, in many instances, prevailed. These cases took years
to reach a final conclusion and costs were high.
Therefore, trademark owners argued that they needed an
administrative proceeding by which they could obtain domain
name rights for their trademarks without having to endure federal
litigation along with all the expenses and lost time such litigation
21
would entail.
3. Immunize Registrars
Although the interests of trademark owners were definitely a
driving force behind the UDRP, on an equal footing was the need
to make the Registrars immune from suit. Network Solutions, Inc.
22
(NSI) was the sole registrar of domain names from 1991 to 1999.
NSI has been sued several times for contributory trademark
23
The doctrine of contributory trademark
infringement.
infringement and the precedent seemed to indicate that these suits
19. Mueller, supra note 2, at 5.
20. Id.
21. Id. (explaining that the UDRP was not designed to replace courts, but to
resolve the most egregious and easiest types of cybersquatting cheaply and
quickly).
22. Scott Hejny, Opening the Door to Controversy: How Recent ICANN Decisions
Have Muddied the Waters of Domain Dispute Resolution, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1037, 1040
(2001) (stating that NSI registered over 2.7 million domain names and reported
profits of nearly 36 million dollars).
23. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980
th
th
(9 Cir. 1999); Watts v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 276 (7 Cir. 1999); Seven
Words, LLC v. Network Solutions, 260 F.3d 1089 (2001).
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were anything but frivolous. NSI clearly provided the
instrumentality by which the cybersquatters’ infringement or
dilution was made possible. Didn’t the registrars have any
responsibility to police what they were registering? Could they just
pretend they were Sergeant Schultz forever and claim they saw no
evil, heard no evil, knew no evil and therefore the evil could not
exist? Probably not.
Therefore, the UDRP provides for complete immunity from
suit for any approved Registrar if they register a domain name that
24
later turns out to be the valid trademark of a third party.
Registrars are for-profit enterprises. If they were likely to be
sued as often as NSI for contributory trademark infringement, it is
unlikely that many companies would be interested in joining. The
buzzword was “competition”. The UDRP should create a
competitive field for registration services. This competition would
25
drive down costs for users and drive up the quality of services.
All of this would be for naught, however, if the Registrars
would be sued for contributory trademark infringement as often as
NSI was. Therefore, in the end, the UDRP provides a complete
blanket of protection for Registrars, and if trademark owners are to
sue anyone, it must be the cybersquatter (or the domain name
itself).
4. International Intrigue
The final meaningful motivation behind the UDRP was a
recognized need to be the international leader in what domain
name dispute resolution policies around the world would look like.
Many countries around the world are now providing domain name
dispute resolutions services, which bypass litigation in these
26
countries. Most of these policies look very much like the UDRP.
24. UDRP, supra note 1, ¶ 2.
25. National Communications and Information Administration, Improvement
for Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826 (Feb. 20,
1998) [hereinafter Green Paper]; National Communication and Information
Administration, Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741
(June 10, 1998), available at 1998 WL 298883 [hereinafter White Paper].
26. Japan has adopted a verbatim translation of the UDRP to resolve domain
name conflicts over the .jp country code domain names. The only difference in
the Japanese version is use or registration is bad faith rather than use and
registration in the U.S. See Japan Network Information Center, JP Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, Nov. 10, 2000, available at http://www.nic.ad.jp/en/regist/
dom/doc/jp-drp-policy-e.html. Under the Janpanese UDRP, fourteen cases have
been brought and eleven cases resulted in name transfer.
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At the time of its drafting, there was a concern that multiple
dispute resolution policies that did not go far enough to protect
trademark owners’ rights would chill use of the Internet as a
commercial endeavor and ease foreign misappropriation of famous
American trademarks.
As such, a policy that was favorable to American trademark
owners and that would be the model for other countries to follow
was necessary. If other policies came on line first, they may not have
the provisions deemed necessary to protect American trademark
and commercial interests. Therefore, one of the main purposes of
the UDRP was to provide international leadership in how to deal
with cybersquatting.
B. Substance
The UDRP operates as a contract of adhesion for every
registrant of a domain name. Each domain name registration is
27
given subject to the terms and conditions of each Registrar. If an
applicant refuses to abide by the UDRP’s provisions for dispute
resolution, the registration will be cancelled or not registered in
28
the first place.
Paragraph four of the UDRP is the real substance of the policy.
By the tone of the entire UDRP, it is easy to tell who is the intended
audience. It states as follows:
You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative
proceeding in the event that a third party (a
“complainant”) asserts to the applicable Provider, in
compliance with the Rules of Procedure, that:
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark or service mark in which the
complainant has rights;
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in
respect of the domain name; and
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is
29
being used in bad faith.
The Complainant must demonstrate that each of these
27. UDRP Policy, supra note 1, at ¶ 1 (stating that the Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy is incorporated by reference into ones Registration Agreement).
28. Id. ¶ 3.
29. Id. ¶ 4(a) (emphasis added).

04PORT.DOC

1100

2/17/2002 4:40 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:3

30

elements is satisfied. Notice that paragraph 4(iii) requires domain
name registration and use of the domain name, both in bad faith,
31
before paragraph 4 elements are satisfied.
Pursuant to the UDRP, bad faith means:
1. Registrant acquired domain name in order to
preclude trademark owner from reflecting the mark
in a corresponding domain name;
2. Registrant acquired domain name primarily to sell
it or otherwise traffic in such domain name;
Domain name was registered primarily to disrupt
business activities of a competitor;
4. Domain name was registered for commercial gain
32
by creating a likelihood of confusion.
The UDRP provides for the following defenses:
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use
of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain
name or a name corresponding to the domain name
in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or
services; or
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other
organization) have been commonly known by the
domain name, even if you have acquired no
trademark or service mark rights; or

30. Id.
31. The wording of paragraph four was of some concern in the drafting stage.
The text of the final version of paragraph four requires bad faith to be shown by a
Complainant in the registration and the use of a domain name. Some were
apparently concerned that such a level of proof would make it very difficult to
prove cybersquatting in if the domain name were not used but just “warehoused.”
This is one point in the UDRP where the language actually appears to be neutral.
However, it did not take long for Panelists to overcome this apparent obstacle. In
telstra.org, the Panel found that non-use of the registered domain name by the
alleged cybersquatting Respondent amounted to bad faith use if one paid “close
attention to all the circumstances of Respondent’s behavior.” The Respondent had
taken affirmative steps to hide his identity. Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Nuclear
Marshmallows, No. D2000-0003 (WIPO Feb. 18, 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-0003.html. This has lead
one commentator to refer to such Panelists’ opinions as following what the
commentator refers to as “the inaction doctrine” and that “[I]f the doctrine
extends beyond the bounds of the Policy, however, it may expand trademark
rights too far and jeopardize the credibility of the UDRP.” John G. White, ICANN’s
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy in Action, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 229,
241-42 (2001).
32. UDRP, supra note 1, at ¶ 4(b).
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(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or
fair use of the domain name, without intent for
commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or
33
to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
C. Procedure
The Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
34
Policy (RUDRP) provide basic rules for procedure, which all
Providers must follow. However, it allows Providers to develop their
own rules regarding the length of opinions, fees charged, and
35
various other matters. Generally, all Providers require a complaint
36
to be less than 5,000 words or a maximum of ten pages. It must be
37
served on the Provider and the Respondent. It must allege all of
38
the elements of paragraph 4, and it must indicate any request for
39
a three-member Panel. The fees for resolution of one domain
name are approximately $950-$2000 if a single Panel is selected
40
and $2,500-$4500 if a three-member Panel is selected. The

33. Id. at ¶ 4(c).
34. ICANN, Rules for Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, available at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm (adopted Aug. 26, 1999)
[hereinafter UDRP Rules].
35. See id. ¶¶ 15(e), 19(a).
36. CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, CPR’s Supplemental Rules and Fee
Schedule, available at http://www.cpradr.org/ICANN_RulesAndFees.htm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2002) [hereinafter CPR’s Supplemental]; National Arbitration Forum,
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution “UDRP” Supplemental Rules, Feb. 1, 2002,
available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/UDRP/rules.asp [hereinafter
NAF’s Supplemental]; World Intellectual Property Organization, Supplemental Rules
for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Dec. 1, 1999, available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/rules/supplemental.html.
37. UDRP Rules, supra note 34, ¶ 3(a), 3(b)(xii).
38. Id. at ¶ 3(b)(ix).
39. Id. at ¶ 3(b)(iv).
40. Provider supplemental rules and fees show that CPR charges $2,000 for a
single panelist and $4,500 for a three-member panel based on the resolution of
one to two domain names. EResolution (now defunct) charged $1,250 for a single
panelist and $2,900 for a three-member panel based on the resolution of one to
two domain names. NAF charges $950 for a single panelist and $2,500 for a threemember panel based on resolution of one domain name, while it charges $1,100
for a single panelist and $2,500 for a three-member panel based on two domain
name resolutions. WIPO charges $1,500 for a single panelist and $3,000 for a
three-member panel for resolution of one to five domain names. CPR’s
Supplemental, supra note 36; eResolution, eResolution Supplemental Rules, at
http://www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/p_r/supprules.htm; NAF’s Supplemental,
supra note 36; WIPO Admin. & Mediation Ctr., Schedule of Fees under ICANN Policy,
Aug. 15, 2000, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/fees/index.html.
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RUDRP allows for the Respondent to reply within twenty days,
and if the Respondent does not reply in twenty days, the RUDRP
42
allows the Panel to proceed as if the matter were “uncontested.”
The decision of the Panelist is final; there is no appeal
procedure within the UDRP. A non-prevailing party’s only remedy
is to file suit in a federal court to obtain an injunction ordering the
Registrar to refrain from canceling or transferring the domain
43
name.
UDRP decisions are fast. A decision is issued thirty to ninety
44
days after the date of filing, and the majority of cases take less
than forty-five days. Although justice delayed may be justice denied,
there is no evidence that swift justice is fair justice. Although many
individual Panelists appear to have—on their own initiative—
allowed Respondents who try to respond but (for whatever reason)
miss the twenty-day deadline, there is no objective data on how
many of those Respondents elected not to respond simply because
they did not have enough time to file a response.
Although providing a quick resolution to the issue of
cybersquatting is one of the stated objectives of the UDRP, the
Policy propels so many cases through the system at such speed
that—as will be shown below—mistakes or inconsistencies are made
that detract from the legitimacy of the UDRP. Besides, although
the alternative of federal litigation may take too long from the
trademark owner’s perspective, there is no evidence that providing
a longer response time (e.g., sixty days) would substantially
undermine the point of the UDRP.

VI. PROVIDERS
One of the most questionable aspects of the UDRP is the
selection and maintenance of Providers. To become a Provider, an
45
entity of arbitrators must meet ICANN’s requirements. Most of
these requirements involve showing administrative competence:
In general, ICANN examines the applications to
41. UDRP Rules, supra note 34, at ¶ 5(a).
42. Id. at ¶¶ 5(e), 14(a).
43. Id. at ¶ 18.
44. See id. at ¶¶ 5(a), 6(b), 15(b), 16(a).
45. ICANN, Information Concerning Approval Process for Dispute Resolution Service
Providers, Feb. 2, 2002, available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-providerapproval-process.htm.
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determine whether the applicant has demonstrated its
ability to handle proceedings in an expedited, global,
online context in an orderly and fair manner. Attributes
that are especially important include:
A. Applicant should have a track record in
competently handling the clerical aspects of ADR
proceedings. ICANN considers proper review of
pleadings for administrative compliance and reliable
and well-documented distribution of documents to
the parties and panels to be essential capabilities for
providers. In the absence of a well-established track
record in handling the clerical function, a detailed
plan for providing those abilities ordinarily must be
submitted.
B. Applicant should propose a list of highly qualified
neutrals who have agreed to serve as panelists.
Applicant’s list should include at least twenty persons.
Applicants are expected thoroughly to train the listed
neutrals concerning the policy, the uniform rules, the
technology of domain names, and the basic legal
principles applicable to domain-name disputes.
Accordingly, excessively long lists of neutrals are
discouraged.
The applicant should either present a list of panelists
from multiple countries or, if the applicant initially
presents a single-country list, propose a plan to
expand its list to become multinational.
C. Applicant’s supplemental rules and internal
procedures should demonstrate that applicant
understands the workings of the policy and unifom
46
[sic] rules.
As this article concludes—and many other commentators have
stated—the data, reported below, indicates that there is a serious
concern about Provider bias in resolving cases. This apparent bias
has caused one Provider to cease offering services to new
complainants. The only Provider with an apparent objective track
record in dispute resolution services, eResolution, dropped out in
47
December 2001. The company stated that new filings were down
46.
47.

Id.
Steven Bonisteel, Arbitration Firm Quits Domain-Dispute Business,
NEWSBYTES, Dec. 3, 2001, available at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/
172619.html; 2001 WL 23420688; ICANN, Approved Providers for UDRP, updated
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and claimed concerns about bias and trademark owners forum
48
shopping as reasons for their decision.
In a surprising move that seems to further question the
legitimacy of the Provider system, ICANN announced just days after
eResolution dropped out that a new Provider would take its place.
Beginning February 28, 2002, the Asian Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Centre (ADNDRC) will begin accepting filings pursuant
49
to the UDRP.
Applications for other Providers appear to be pending.
ICANN’s timing in announcing ADNDRC as the new Provider is
suspect. Although it may be entirely benign, why did ICANN
choose to announce the addition of ADNDRC just days after
eResolution’s withdrawal, when the applications of ADNDRC and
many other Providers had been pending for some time?
In the end, the addition of ADNDRC is an extremely positive
step for one reason: before ADNDRC’s inclusion, no Provider
could handle disputes in anything but the English language.
ADNDRC is committed to providing dispute resolution services in
50
Asian languages, and this may be a very positive move for Asian
trademark holders.
As of this writing, the four recognized Providers are as follows:
(1) National Arbitration Forum (NAF)
(2) World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
(3) CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPR)
(4) Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre
51
(ADNDR)
As the data below will make clear, NAF and WIPO handle the
vast majority of disputes, and panelists cross the list between NAF
and WIPO with significant frequency. Therefore, there are a small
Feb. 5, 2002, available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm
(stating that eRes was not accepting proceedings commenced after Nov. 30, 2001)
[hereinafter ICANN, Approved Providers]; see also eResolution, eResolution: Integrity
Online, at http://www.eresolution.org (last updated Dec. 14, 2001) (“eResolution
has folded its operations.”).
48. Id.
49. Press Release, ICANN, ICANN Announces New Dispute Resolution
Provider in the Asia Pacific Region (Dec. 3, 2001), available at
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-03dec01.htm [hereinafter
ICANN, Announcement].
50. Id.
51. ICANN, Approved Providers, supra note 49; ICANN Announcement, supra note
49.
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number of individuals that decide the majority of disputes brought
under the UDRP.
VII. DATA
The data regarding the number of disputes filed, resolved and
otherwise disposed of is quite startling. From ICANN’s reported
data, this essay first identifies the sheer numbers involved.
Table One: Summary of Status of Proceedings52
Proceedings

Domain
Names

Proceeding Status

355

529

Pending

34

59

Case suspended at complainant’s request

5

5

Case suspended, other

394

593

Total undisposed proceedings

3225

5573

Name transfer

31

41

Registration cancelled

786

1012

Decision for respondent

27

522

Split decision

4069

7148

Dispositions by decision

6

6

Settlement with transfer

18

18

Settlement, unspecific result

3

6

Dismissal with prejudice

410

644

Dismissal without prejudice

90

107

Dismissal, unspecified

527

781

Dispositions without decision

12

13

Proceedings terminated for recommencement

Table One indicates that the Providers are very busy. In the
two years since the first case brought under the UDRP was decided,
52. ICAAN, Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, Jan. 2, 2002, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedingsstat.htm [hereinafter Summary of Proceedings].
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53

Providers have been issuing over five and a half opinions per day.
As indicated above, to date, there have been principally two
Providers issuing most of the decisions and there is significant
crossover when Panelists work for both WIPO and NAF. This is an
incredible workload for a small number of individuals.
Regarding the issue of expeditiousness, it is interesting to note
that ICANN reports only twenty-four total cases have settled out of
4,990 proceedings (.49%). The settlement data indicates that six of
the settled cases required a transfer of the domain name and the
rest settled with an “unspecific result.” ICANN produces no data to
ascertain what an “unspecific result” might be. It is interesting to
note, however, that until December of 2001, ICANN also was
reporting the number of cases that settled “without transfer”. In the
first two years of reporting, ICANN reported that the number of
cases that settled “without transfer” was zero. Therefore, ICANN
now has dropped that data from their Summary of Status of
Proceedings. Why? Because it never happens. Why does it never
happen? It may simply be that things are moving so quickly that
settlement is nearly impossible.
The most striking data in Table One, however, is the fact that
Complainants prevail in 81% of the proceedings regarding 86% of
54
the domain names. This means that only 14% of the domain
names subject to the UDRP are not transferred to the
Complainant.
Michael Geist, of the University of Ottawa, has written perhaps
the most convincing study regarding the bias of Providers and
55
Panelists. The data Geist culled from interviews, surveys of
Panelists, counting cases as reported by ICANN, and other
laborious methodologies is also striking.

53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
See Geist, supra note 2.
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Table Two. Forum Shopping: Provider Percentage of Overall
NAF
82.9% Complainant
Win Percentage

eRes
63.4% Complainant
Win Percentage

eRes
7%

CPR
59.1% Complainant
Win Percentage

WIPO
82.2% Complainant
Win Percentage

CRP
1%

NAF
34%

WIPO
58%

Caseload & Provider Complainant Win Percentage (July 7, 2001)56
Table Two shows that WIPO and NAF have dominated the
provision of dispute resolution services. As of July 7, 2001, 92% of
all cases were brought to either NAF or WIPO. By October of 2001,
eResolution’s market share was down to 7% and NAF and WIPO’s
combined share was 92%. CPR’s share has remained at 1%, or
57
statistically irrelevant.
Regarding the issue of Provider bias, however, Geist reports
that Complainant win percentage in cases WIPO Panelists handled
was 82.2% and in cases NAF Panelists handled the Complainant
58
win percentage was 82.9%. With eResolution reporting only a
59
63.4% win percentage for trademark owners, it is not surprising
that their workload has dissipated and they have stopped taking
60
new cases.

56. Id. at 6.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. ICANN, Approved Providers, supra note 47 (stating that eRes was not
accepting proceedings commencing after Nov. 30, 2001); see also eResolution:
Integrity Online, at http://www.eresolution.org/ (last updated Dec. 14, 2001)
(“eResolution has folded its operations.”).
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Table Three: Complainant Win Percentage:
Single vs. Three-Member Panels (July 7, 2001)61
Complainant Win Percentage
Three Member Panel
Single

Provider

eRES

NAF

WIPO

Overall
Figures

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

Geist also tabulated the percentage of Complainant wins when
they requested a three-judge panel rather than a single judge
panel. His findings are reported in Table Three. Table Three
indicates that Complainants fair substantially better before single
62
member panels.
The lesson for Respondents is clear: always
request three member panels. Your chances of success go up
drastically if you do.
Some have argued that the numbers Geist reports are
63
skewed. That is, WIPO and NAF handle a large number of
64
uncontested cases. It is not surprising that a large percentage
(virtually all since they are default cases) result in a domain name
transfer in favor of the Complainant.
Table four shows the names of several Panelists and their
65
corresponding Complainant win percentages. To be sure, James
66
Carmody’s caseload was nearly 75% uncontested cases. As such,
61. Id. at 19.
62. Id.
63. Summary of Proceedings, supra note 52; Mueller, supra note 2 (providing
statistical summary through Nov. 2000).
64. Mueller, supra note 2 at 10-13.
65. See Geist, supra note 2, at 24.
66. Id.
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the fact that he held for the Complainant nearly 96% of the time is
67
not as inflammatory as it first appears. However, Paul Dorf’s
68
caseload is only about 19% uncontested cases. This less adequately
explains the apparent overwhelming success rate of the
Complainant.
Furthermore, the allocation of single member panels is
theoretically random. Are we to believe that James Carmody
randomly received such a huge percentage of single member panel
complaints while others, with express views more hostile to the
UDRP, received none?
Although some of the numbers that seem to indicate Provider
bias can be explained by the number of default cases, it does not
explain why James Carmody is so busy with single member default
cases while Milton Mueller, an avowed critic of the UDRP and
69
equally registered with NAF has received none.
Table Four: NAF Caseload Data: Decisions of Top Six Panelists
Sitting as Sole Panelists (July 7, 2001)70
95.7% Complainant Win Percentage
James Carmody
(140 Cases Decided)

97.2% Complainant Win Percentage

Top Six NAF Panelists Sitting as Sole Panelists

Carolyn Marks Johnson
(106 Cases Decided)

93.5% Complainant Win Percentage
James P. Buchele
(76 Cases Decided)

94.7% Complainant Win Percentage
Ralph Yachnin
(76 Cases Decided)

Held for Complainant
Held for Respondent

93.2% Complainant Win Percentage
Harold Kalina
(59 Cases Decided)

81.5% Complainant Win Percentage
Paul Dorf
(54 Cases Decided)

0

20
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60

80
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120

140

Cases Decided (53%of NAF Cumulative Caseload)

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Geist, supra note 2, at 26. Prof. Milton has participated in seven cases but
never as a sole panelist. Id. In those cases the complainant has won only twice one
of which Miltion dissented. Id.
70. Id. at 24.
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To continue to pick on James Carmody for absolutely no personal
reason whatsoever, he is clearly the busiest Panelist. Table Five
indicates that as of July 7, 2001, he had decided over 14% of all of
71
NAF’s domain name cases under the UDRP. Again, with so many
Panelists registered to receive cases, if there is a reason NAF prefers
to assign James Carmody cases, other than the fact that he holds in
favor of the Complainant much of the time, they ought to
articulate that. This data that Geist compiled indicates that
something is amuck. Under a system in which single member
panels are randomly assigned, how can one person (with 75% of
his caseload being default cases) hear so many cases? Most likely
this is not coincidence.
Table Five: Busiest Panelists By Provider: Sole Panelist or as
Presiding Panelist on Three-Member Panels (July 7, 2001)72
The National Arbitration Forum (NAF)
Panelist
James A. Carmody
Carolyn Marks Johnson
James P. Buchele
Ralph Yachnin
Harold Kalina
Paul A. Dorf
Combined Percentage

Number
of Cases
148
111
80
77
60
54

% of NAF
Caseload
14.16%
10.62 %
7.66%
7.37%
5.74%
5.17%
50.72%

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
Panelist
Sir Ian Barker
Frederick M. Abbott
M. Scott Donahey
Jeffrey M. Samuels
Richard W. Page
Dennis A. Foster
Combined Percentage

71.
72.

Id. at 35.
Id.

Number
of Cases
64
58
54
53
53
52

% of WIPO
Caseload
3.51%
3.18%
2.96%
2.90%
2.90%
2.85%
18.30%
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eResolution (eRes)
Panelist
Richard Hill
Giovanni Ziccardi
Sandra A. Sellers
Alan L. Limbury
David Lametti
Richard D. Faulkner
Combined Percentage

Number
of Cases
9
7
7
6
6
6

% of eRes
Caseload
4.46%
3.47%
3.47%
2.97%
2.97%
2.97%
20.3%

Table Six shows the number of cases commenced per month
73
since the inception of the UDRP. Demand peaked in August of
74
2000 when nearly 350 new cases were filed. On average the filing
75
fee for each UDRP case is approximately $1,300. Therefore, the
total market value of UDRP dispute resolution services in the
month of August 2000 was nearly $450,000. Although the trend for
76
much of the year of 2001 was downward, by October the number
of new claim filings had increased to over 290 cases filed in that
month alone. As such, the total market of dispute resolution
services for the year of 2001 will be well over $3 million. Statistics
from the last quarter indicate the number of new claims has leveled
off at approximately 250 new cases a month or a $325,000 total
77
income stream per month for the Providers.

73. Mueller, supra note 2, at 7.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 26-27 app. 1; Barbara A. Solomon, Two New Tools to Combat
Cyberpiracy, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 679, 720 n.145 (2000). The filing fee in most
district courts is $150 while the fee for a UDRP proceeding ranges from $1000 to
$1500, depending on the provider. Id.
76. ICANN, UDRP Proceedings—Indexed by Commencement Date, at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-list.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2002)
[hereinafter ICANN, UDRP Proceedings].
77. See infra note 78.
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Table Six: Number of UDRP New Case Filings Per Month78 (Dec.
1999 to Jan. 30, 2002)

# Cases Commenced
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VIII. PROBLEMS WITH THE UDRP SYSTEM
A. Forum Shopping
Forum shopping is perhaps the most obvious issue ICANN
needs to address. Although some Providers can argue that it
79
doesn’t exist, overwhelming data indicates that it does. After Geist
80
released his study claiming bias and forum shopping,
eResolution’s market dried up and they stopped providing dispute
81
resolution services.
78. Table six was created from data found on ICANN’s website which lists
proceedings of disputes by commencement date. Recently, ICANN has rearranged
this data into a new format. Now, the information is much more difficult to gather
compared to when the data from January 1999 to August 2001 was determined.
Thus, the number of proceedings by commencement date are off by plus or minus
five cases. ICANN, UDRP Proceedings, supra note 76.
79. See Geist, supra note 2, at 24; Annette Kur, UDRP: A Study by the MaxPlanck-Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition
Law, Munich, available at http://www.intellecprop.mpg.de/Online-Publikationen/
2002/UDRP-study-final-02.doc (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
80. Id.
81. ICANN, Approved Providers, supra note 60 (stating that eRes was not
accepting proceedings commenced after Nov. 30, 2001); see also eResolution:
Integrity Online, at http://www.eresolution.org/ (last updated Dec. 14, 2001)
(“eResolution has folded its operations.”).
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B. Inconsistent or Incorrect Opinions
82

Or should we just say unbelievable. There are now so many
nonsensical opinions that it would be impossible to list or discuss
all of them in this essay. Some of my favorites are as follows:
83
In Familiar Limited v. CTD Technologies, Joan Clark, a
WIPO solo panelist, held that the domain name,
Familiar.com, should be transferred to a small software
development company incorporated in 1991 in the U.K.
under the name, Familiar Limited. Familiar Limited had
agreed to purchase the domain name from the registrant,
but the registrant failed to comply with the transfer.
Familiar Limited had not and has not registered Familiar
84
as a trademark in the U.K. or anywhere else.
The entire legal analysis of whether the Respondent acted in
bad faith is as follows:
The Panel finds that Connect-the-Dots, Inc. acquired the
domain name from CTD Technologies, Inc., the named
Respondent which did not respond to the Complaint.
Connect-the-Dots, Inc. declared itself the owner of the
domain name, filed the Response and is clearly in control
of the domain name. The Panel also finds that Connectthe-Dots, Inc., the holder of the domain name, acted in
bad faith in that it acquired and has used the domain
name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting or
otherwise transferring it to the Complainant or a
competitor for an exaggerated consideration, contrary to
85
paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy.
86
In Tata Sons Ltd. v. D & V. Enter., Michael Ophir, another
WIPO solo Panelist, ordered the cancellation of the domain name
87
“bodacious-tatas.com”. The Complainant was Tata Sons Limited,
an India investment company that alleges over $9 billion in sales in
the United States alone with multiple joint ventures around the
82. Of course, the vast majority of cases that Panelists have written make
perfect sense, but they are no fun to talk about.
83. Familiar Ltd. v. CTD Tech., Inc., Case No. D2001-1009 (WIPO Nov. 5,
2001), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d20011009.html.
84. Id. at 5-6.
85. Id. at 6. Panelist Clark concluded that there was bad faith and ordered the
domain name transferred. Id. at 6-7.
86. Tata Sons v. D&V Enters., Case No. D2000-0479 (WIPO Aug. 18, 2000),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0479.html.
87. Id. at 11-12.
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88

world bearing the “Tata” trademark.
Although this was an uncontested case, Panelist Ophir
concluded:
The Panel would add additional aggravating
circumstances such as the reasonable assumption that the
repute and goodwill of the Complainant, the high quality
of its goods and services and its standing must have been
known to the Respondent since it was on these and other
qualitative elements that he built the outspoken sexuality,
promiscuity and pornography under the heading of
89
“bodacious-tatas”.
In an actually quite well reasoned opinion that comes to a
comical end, solo panelist, James Bridgeman ordered a host of
domain names all in the line of “guiness-beer-reallysucks.com” and
“guiness-really-really-sucks.com” to be transferred to Guiness
90
because of a likelihood of confusion.
Solo Panelist, Dr. Kamen Troller, held that by refusing to
accept Complainant’s offer to purchase the domain name
“tonsil.com” for $100, Respondent was implicitly requesting more
91
money and was therefore acting in bad faith.
92
In August 2001, the Panelist in Storck K.G. v. Unimetal Sanayai
ordered “merci.com” to be transferred without any
acknowledgement in the opinion that the domain name means
“thank you” in a generic sense in the French language.
93
Finally, for our purposes here, in Alta Vista Co. v. S.M.A., Inc.,
presiding Panelist Jeffrey Samuels, former Trademark
Commissioner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
concluded in a footnote as follows:
The Panel notes that the copies of the registration
certificates annexed to the Complaint indicate that the
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id. at 11.
90. Diageo PLC v. Zuccarini, Case No. D2000–0996 (WIPO Oct. 22, 2000), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0996.html.
91. Süüd-Chemie AG v. Tonsil.com, Case No. D2000-0376 (WIPO July 3,
2000) at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0376.html
(“Choosing not to reply to the Complainant’s overture of an offer of US $ 100-200
for the name tonsil.com, Ms. Comito made it clear that she wanted more than outof-pocket costs to sell the rights to the domain name.”).
92. August Storck KG v. Unimetal Sanayi ve Tic A.S., Case No. D2001-1125
(WIPO Nov. 23, 2001), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/
d2001-1125.html.
93. AltaVista Co v. S.M.A., Inc., Case No. D2000-0927 (WIPO Oct. 4, 2000), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0927.html.
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marks and registrations in issue are owned by Digital
Equipment Corp. Based on its own investigation, the
Panel determines that the marks and registrations have
94
been assigned to Complainant.
This last case is not an example of an absurd result. This last
case demonstrates the steps Panelists will take to expedite cases. In
traditional litigation, if the plaintiff fails to offer proof that it is the
owner of the trademark at issue, the complaint would be defective
and, unless amended by the plaintiff (and not the court), the case
95
would be dismissed. Under the UDRP, however, speed is the
primary objective. Thus, Panelist Samuels searched the PTO
records himself, realized the Complainant’s error, corrected it, and
96
proceeded to hold in the Complainant’s favor. The conclusion
may have been meritorious. I only raise this as an example of what
might be lost in Panelists’ haste to reach conclusions.
This list is in no way exhaustive. Although there are plenty of
“good” cases, the number of absurd cases such as these brings into
question the credibility and legitimacy of the UDRP system. If
nothing else, the first two quotations above indicate that the
Panelists should at least learn to write in the English language.
C. Single Panelist Issues
97

The Geist study and others seem to indicate that the
Complainant is much more likely to prevail when there is a single
panelist than when there are three panelists. Geist concludes that
98
bias is suggested when single panelists decide cases. The argument
that a single Panelist hears virtually all uncontested cases seems to
answer part of the discrepancy but not all of it.
Furthermore, even if single Panelists are not biased, the quality
of the decision-making clearly goes down significantly when there is
one Panelist rather than three. Virtually all of the absurd results
99
came from solo Panelists.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 4.
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125 (c) (1), 1127 (2001).
AltaVista, supra note 93
See Geist, supra note 2.
Id. at 19.
See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
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D. Panelist Workloads
Some of the busiest Panelists currently write up to two
100
101
opinions per week. Many Panelists are not this busy at all.
There is clearly not any sort of fair distribution of labor among the
Panelists. Even if one can do quality work at writing two opinions a
week, why should anyone have to? Why is this a good thing? Why
have the Providers created such a discrepancy?
It appears that Providers are pretty secure with the outcomes
of some Panelists and not secure with others. It appears that
Providers are assigning cases to Panelists who will hold in favor of
the trademark owner. It appears that the Panelist bias that Geist
102
cited may be less of an issue than Provider bias in assigning cases.
Of course, in a commercialized for-profit system where the
trademark owners are paying up to $450,000 a month for these
103
services, they ought to be prevailing most of the time. To insure
their income stream, Providers have a perfect profit incentive to
assure that Panelists hold in favor of the Complainant trademark
owner most of the time. If not, trademark owners will not use their
services and all Providers will be forced to go the way of
eResolutions.
E. White Paper of June 1998
Although there was significant writing on the wall before 1998,
104
the White Paper of June of 1998 sealed the fate of the UDRP. In
the White Paper, a privatized, commercial, for-profit dispute
resolution system was proposed and accepted by NSI, the United
105
States government, and the trademark lobby. This turned the
inherently public function of identifying and enforcing the scope
of intellectual property rights into a private affair. Once it became
privatized, general rules of fair play became obfuscated. The
primary objective became the protection of Registrars from liability
and the quick, efficient return of trademarks to trademark
106
owners.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Mueller, supra note 2, at 7.
Id.
See Geist, supra note 2, at 24.
Mueller, supra note 2, app. 1, at 26-27.
White Paper, supra note 25.
Id. at 74-49.
See Geist, supra note 2, at 13 (citing the White Paper).
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Again, this essay is not in defense of so-called cybersqatting.
However, when we made the inherently public function of
registering and enforcing intellectual property rights into a multimillion dollar per year business, it is unreasonable to think of it as a
fair or impartial system. Let’s just call it was it is: a commercial
dispute resolution business created by trademark owners, for
trademark owners, and operated and adjudicated by trademark
owners or their agents.

IX. SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Make Three-Member Panels Mandatory
108

Making all panels three-member panels is a good idea. This
would be easy to do and the costs would be passed on to the
principle beneficiaries of the system: Complainant trademark
109
owners. Many of Geist’s concerns of bias would be alleviated, and
substantively absurd results may be reduced. The implication from
110
111
Geist and others that the system is simply illegitimate would be
dealt with, and the general credibility of Panelists’ decisions—and
the system in general—would improve.
B. Quality Control
Regarding absurd, inconsistent or simply fanciful decisions,
Providers could create a high standard of qualifications for each
Panelist to meet. Panelist decisions could be reviewed. Training
could be provided. Panelists who do not meet the standards could
be released. Apparently eResolution dropped ten panelists for
112
these reasons in 2001.
Naturally, Providers have no economic reason to take quality
control measures. For every dime they spend on quality control,
their profit margin goes down. In this high volume business, it is
107. For a definition of cybersquatting see Yan, supra note 9, at 803-04.
108. See generally Geist, supra note 2, at 26-29 (recommending mandatory threemember panels).
109. Id. at 22-26.
110. Id. at 32.
111. Mueller, supra note 2 at 25.
112. Geist, supra note 2 at 30 (citing an e-mail correspondence with an
eResolution representative).
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cheaper and easier to use the system of assigning cases to simply
avoid assigning new cases to Panelists who write bad decisions.
There is no data to support this conclusion, but it seems a
reasonable inference from the existing data.
Therefore, Providers do not control the quality of the very
product they are marketing: dispute resolution services. As long as
the trademark owners keep winning and the paying customer is
happy, why should they?
C. Juries
113

Some have recommended using juries in UDRP cases. This
seems like a bad idea to me. Although I am a strong advocate of the
jury system in the United States as a check on the government and
as a symbol of democracy, juries in UDRP cases would unduly delay
matters. Although a jury might be able to educate a Panelist about
114
the colloquial and generic nature of the term “bodacious,” juries
would most likely delay matters and the UDRP would be reserved
for major cases.
This may not be a bad result; the data supports the conclusion
that the UDRP is overused. Perhaps a mechanism can be created
where complainants bring only truly serious cases to the UDRP for
resolution. However, the administrative complexities of having a
jury decide cases does not seem like a good idea to me.
D. Caseload Distribution
115

If, as the Providers indicate,

each Panelist is equally

113. D.G. Post, Juries and the UDRP, ICANN WATCH, Sept. 6, 2000, at
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/juries_and_the_udrp.htm.
What gives me, or any of the other self-appointed experts who are serving
as arbitrators of these disputes, any special claim to wisdom on this score?
These are precisely the sorts of questions, it seems to me, on which "the
people" should get to air their views, and on which an expert's opinion
carries no more weight than anyone else's. They are "legal" questions, but
those trained in the law do not have any special competence to
determine their answer in any particular case. They are ultimately
questions about the reasonableness (or lack thereof) of conduct - just the
sort of question we place, under the 7th Amendment, before the jury to
decide.
Id.
114. See e.g., Tata Sons Ltd. v. D & V. Enter., No. D2000-0479 (WIPO Aug. 18,
at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0479.html
2000),
(ordering the cancellation of the domain name “bodacious-tatas.com”).
115. See Geist, supra note 2 at 23.
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competent to decide cases, equally impartial, and equally available,
a more even distribution of caseloads seems to be called for. An
even distribution of caseloads, including the imposition of caseload
maximums, would most likely result in higher quality judging.
E. Use filters
The use of filters really has a lot of potential as more and more
trademark systems around the world become automated, including
116
the U.S. system.
Brandy International has put all Japanese
registered trademarks online and transliterated each into its
117
phonetic English equivalent. With these systems in place, it seems
that Registrars could be required to do a quick filter of domain
name applications. They could run each application through a
trademark filter, which would consist of all known trademark
registrations in the United States and elsewhere. If registered
trademarks are disclosed, the applicant could make a showing as to
how and why they are deserving of the domain name registration.
While the technology is clearly available to make this happen,
two problems may arise: cost and time. Of course, Registrars do not
have much incentive to pursue such filters. First, they are immune
from liability. As such, why should they exert time, money and
energy on filters when they no longer have any responsibility
regarding the registration of third parties’ trademarks as domain
names?
In that sense, it seems that the UDRP has chilled Registrars’
interest in innovations. As they are free from liability, they can
advertise immediate registration of domain names. If the domain
name is the trademark of a third party, it is exclusively up to that
third party to enforce its rights against the Registrant. The
Registrar is totally out of the loop.
116. See generally PTO Homepage at http://www.pto.org (linking users to cites
such as http://www.bargainname.com for quick domain name search and
registration). For fees ranging from $105 for a four day turn around to $210 for
same day service, Thomson and Thomson conducts comprehensive registered
domain name searches of the U.S. trademark office’s database and searches each
of the individual state trademark databases, and databases from Canada, Western
Europe and Japan. Through it Saegis service Thomson & Thomson allows
subscribers to tailor searches for themselves at twenty-five cents to one dollar a hit.
Thomson & Thomson at http://www.thomson-thomson.com (last visited Feb. 11,
2002).
117. Brandy International, Business Line, available at, http://www.brandy.co.jp/
english/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
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Therefore, some incentive must be added to the system to
make Registrars responsible for what they register. Either the
provisions providing Registrar immunity must be amended or some
other means must be established to make it in the best interest of
Registrars to not register domain names that are the legitimate
trademarks of another.
Of course, this presupposes that one of our objectives is
conflict avoidance. If trademark owners always win, they may not be
conflict adverse. If they are comfortable with their high win rate in
UDRP cases and if each conflict only costs a trademark owner
$1,300, perhaps these owners do not think of conflict avoidance as
an important goal. Or at least, conflict avoidance is less important
than the ability to obtain domain name rights immediately.
If nothing else, application fees should be raised to pay for the
costs of filtering all domain name applications through databases
consisting of registered trademarks throughout the world. Perhaps
rather than creating an “examination” system, Registrants could
simply be placed on notice as to “hits” in such a filter. If a hit turns
out to be actionable under the UDRP and the Applicant proceeds
to Registration anyway, perhaps this could be called “willful
cybersquatting” and a fine of some sort could be levied.
However, insulating the Registrars from liability destroys any
likelihood that Registrars will be interested conflict avoidance. Why
should they?
F. Examination by PTOs
The fate of this argument may be long sealed, but it deserves
resuscitating one last time.
In truth, when the domain name registration system was
created—when ICANN was organized, when the UDRP was
negotiated and put into place, and while the thousands of conflicts
costing trademark owners millions of dollars were going on—a
much better system that had been doing this precise work for a
118
hundred years was already was in place.
That is, rather than create this for-profit, commercialized,
privatized system of both domain name registration and resulting
dispute resolution, it would have made good sense to simply ask the
119
PTO to do the job. Within the PTO are hundreds of trademark
118.
119.

See generally Green Paper, supra note 25.
See PTO Online at http://www.pto.org.
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examiners, each of whom is a law school graduate trained to
identify conflict between proposed uses of trademarks. Currently,
trademark examiners spend the bulk of their days making decisions
about trademark conflicts. If we wanted to avoid conflict, this may
have been a good choice.
Some say this is silly. It takes eighteen months to get a
trademark registration, and it costs hundreds of dollars. Why
should we let the PTO get involved in this? Wouldn’t it unduly
delay the process of domain name acquisition?
This argument only has merit if the PTO treats domain name
applications like that of any other trademark. It wouldn’t have to.
The PTO could create a separate “Office” which would only
register domain names. The United States PTO could act as the
single Registrar for all domain names with a United States country
code, and the PTOs of other nations could do the same. The
examiners could quickly scan the existing state, federal and
common law databases and make determinations rather quickly
regarding whether the applicant was obtaining a domain name in
bad faith (sticking with the substantive provisions of the UDRP, for
sake of argument). Naturally, more examiners would need to be
hired, it would take more time than it currently does to obtain
domain name rights, and it would cost something.
However, the cost of the UDRP is not nothing. Registrars may
not care about the costs associated with the conflict, but consumers
do. Trademark owners are corporations selling goods or services
for a profit. Each dollar they spend enforcing their trademark
rights when someone registers their marks as domain names is
immediately passed on the to the consumer through the increased
cost of their goods or services.
Which option would be cheaper for the consumer: following
the current commercialized dispute resolution system, or allowing
the already trained professionals to make decisions about domain
name availability?
Another factor that is impossible to quantify is the cost
involved in abdicating the governmental role in determining the
scope of intellectual property rights. The current UDRP system
allows trademark owners themselves—through the UDRP Panelists
acting as their agents—to dictate to the rest of the market the
120
scope of individual trademark rights.
120.

UDRP online at, http://www.icann.org/udrp (last visited Feb. 1, 2002).
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The trademark system in the United States was supposed to be
a carefully constructed balance between consumers, trademark
owners, and third parties. First, consumers were supposed to be
protected from confusion as to the source of goods or services.
Second, trademark owners were to be protected to the extent that
they use the mark, and if the continue to invest in trademarks, they
lower society’s search costs. Third, third parties who would like to
enter and compete in a market were to be protected; creating more
competition and avoiding monopolistic prices for goods and
services.
In contrast, the UDRP system is weighted drastically in favor of
the trademark owner. Should we upset our carefully constructed
balance merely so someone can get a domain name registration
quickly? Would it be that difficult to wait a few days before
receiving a domain name registration?

X. CONCLUSION
In writing a law review essay on domain names, one big
concern is that nothing said here may matter by the time the article
is actually published. I sincerely hope that we come to our senses by
this time by figuring out a way to locate web pages in a quicker,
more efficient, and more conflict adverse manner than we
currently are.
I suspect that we won’t.
The existing system gives monopolistic rights to trademark
owners. Why would they want to share the pie when they don’t have
to? If trademark owners win most of the time under the UDRP,
they must be satisfied with the system. If Tata and Sons can make a
121
Registrar cancel “bodacious-tatas.com”, why not go along with
that boondoggle? Tata and Sons could never obtain intellectual
property rights in the phrase “bodacious-tatas” outside of the
domain name system; if they can use the UDRP to squash negative
publicity about their company, why in the world would they not
want to?
However, by giving trademark owners such expansive and new
intellectual property rights, we have also destroyed their interest in
121. Tata Sons Ltd. v. D & V. Enter., Case No. D2000-0479 (WIPO Aug. 18,
2000) at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0479.html
(ordering the cancellation of the domain name “bodacious-tatas.com”).
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coming up with a new and better locator system. The domain
name system may be here for some time. It has very little to do with
technology, but it has mostly to do with the monopoly that
trademark owners are recognizing in this new world: the blue
nowhere.

XI. APPENDIX: UDRP VOCABULARY
ICANN refers to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers.
Complainant means the party initiating a complaint
concerning a domain-name registration.
Mutual Jurisdiction means a court jurisdiction at the location
of either (a) the principal office of the Registrar (provided the
domain-name holder has submitted in its Registration Agreement
to that jurisdiction for court adjudication of disputes concerning or
arising from the use of the domain name) or (b) the domain-name
holder’s address as shown for the registration of the domain name
in Registrar’s Who is database at the time the complaint is
submitted to the Provider.
Panel means an administrative panel appointed by a Provider
to decide a complaint concerning a domain-name registration.
Panelist means an individual appointed by a Provider to be a
member of a Panel.
Party means a Complainant or a Respondent.
Policy means the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy that is incorporated by reference and made a part of the
Registration Agreement.
Provider means a dispute-resolution service provider approved
by ICANN. A list of such
Providers,
a
list
of
which
appears
at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm.
Registrar means the entity with which the Respondent has
registered a domain name that is the subject of a complaint.
Registration Agreement means the agreement between a
Registrar and a domain-name holder.
Respondent means the holder of a domain-name registration
against which a complaint is initiated.

